A Giant Whiff: Why the New CBA Fails Baseball\u27s Smartest Small Market Franchises by Berkon, Jon
DePaul Journal of Sports Law 
Volume 4 
Issue 1 Summer 2007: Symposium - Regulation 
of Coaches' and Athletes' Behavior and Related 
Contemporary Considerations 
Article 3 
A Giant Whiff: Why the New CBA Fails Baseball's Smartest Small 
Market Franchises 
Jon Berkon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jslcp 
Recommended Citation 
Jon Berkon, A Giant Whiff: Why the New CBA Fails Baseball's Smartest Small Market Franchises, 4 DePaul 
J. Sports L. & Contemp. Probs. 9 (2007) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jslcp/vol4/iss1/3 
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Sports Law by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For 
more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
A GIANT WHIFF: WHY THE NEW CBA FAILS
BASEBALL'S SMARTEST SMALL
MARKET FRANCHISES
INTRODUCTION
Just before Game 3 of the World Series, viewers saw something en-
tirely unexpected. No, it wasn't the sight of the Cardinals and Tigers
playing baseball in late October. Instead, it was Commissioner Bud
Selig and Donald Fehr, the head of Major League Baseball Players'
Association (MLBPA), gleefully announcing a new Collective Bar-
gaining Agreement (CBA), thereby guaranteeing labor peace through
2011.1 The deal was struck a full two months before the 2002 CBA
had expired, an occurrence once thought as likely as George Bush and
Nancy Pelosi campaigning for each other in an election year.2
Baseball insiders attributed the deal to the sport's economic health.
"There is little that is earth-shattering about the deal.. .That's because
the baseball business is awash in cash," said leading baseball writer
Peter Gammons. 3 Although this observation is undoubtedly true, it
obscures a crucial link in the causal chain. The last two CBA negotia-
tions stalled when management insisted on measures to reduce payroll
disparity and the MLBPA resisted, because it correctly believed that
those measures would slow salary growth. As Part I of the paper ex-
plains, it was management's decision to support the status quo on the
payroll disparity question that led to the quick resolution of the new
CBA. This decision was a bit surprising, given that management had
tethered itself so tightly to the notion that the sport's competitive bal-
ance depended on more payroll disparity reduction, and that annual
payroll disparity has actually increased in the four years since passage
of the 2002 CBA. 4
1. "Players. Owners Agree to Tentative 5-Year Labor Deal," available at http://sports.espn.go.
com/mlb/news/story?id=2635232
2. -MLB Players, Owners Announce 5-Year Labor Deal," available at http://sports.espn.go.
com/mlb/news/story?id=2637615. "I'd been waiting... to see if we could ever get to the place
where we reached an agreement prior to expiration," said union head Donald Fehr. "And while
I always understood intellectually it was possible and that was the goal, I'm not really sure I
believed that it could happen."
3. Peter Gammons. Money Driving Peaceful Labor Deal, available at http://insider.espn.go.
com/espn/blog/index'?name=gammons-peter (Entry Posted on October 22, 2006)
4. Data collected from "Rodney Fort Database," available at http://www.rodneyfort.com/PH
SportsEcon/Common/OtherData/DataDirectory.html. "Annual Payroll Disparity" (APD) =
Standard Deviation of Team Payrolls/Average Team Payroll. The APD from 1999 to 2002 was
9
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Was management wrong to abandon its campaign to reduce payroll
disparity? No. As Part II illustrates, the further reduction of payroll
disparity is not a precondition to competitive balance, because the
market for baseball talent constrains the impact that payroll size has
on team success. Management, however, ignored the whole concept
of payroll impact in negotiating the current CBA. Part III suggests
that this was a missed opportunity; management should have lever-
aged the structural factors that constrain payroll impact to create a
series of reforms that would improve competitive balance without
harming the financial interests of the MLBPA. Finally, Part IV argues
that management has not made the critical distinction between com-
petitive balance and parity. The revenue sharing system that results
from this omission fails to ensure that well-run small market teams
can compete for championships when their young stars are in their
prime.
The recent labor deal represents a victory for fans, with baseball
continuing unabated for the next five years. Management's willing-
ness to abandon its crusade for payroll disparity reduction contributed
mightily to the labor peace. For that, the owners should be ap-
plauded. Management's unwillingness to embrace alternative mea-
sures to improve competitive balance, however, was a missed
opportunity that will hinder baseball's small market teams.
II. A BRIEF SYNOPSIS OF THE CBA PROVISIONS
In the run up to the 2002 CBA negotiations, Major League Baseball
(MLB) management adopted a new strategy. Instead of advertising
salary reduction as its central goal, management declared that com-
petitive balance was its overriding negotiating principle.5 To add in-
tellectual heft to its competitive balance claims, management
convened the Commissioner's Blue Ribbon Panel (BRP), comprised
of conservative writer George Will, former Federal Reserve Chairman
Paul Volcker, Yale President Richard Levin, and former Senate Ma-
jority Leader George Mitchell. The BRP met for eighteen months
between 1998 and 2000 to study the problem of competitive imbalance
in baseball. The BRP concluded that "[a] high payroll has become an
39.6%; from 2003 to 2006. it was 43.9%. When the Yankees are removed from the equation. the
trend looks different (37.4 pre-CBA and 33.1 post-CBA). The payroll disparity figure in 2006,
excluding the Yankees, was at its lowest level (30.8) since 1996.
5. Doug Pappas. A Contentious History: Baseball's Labor Fights, available at http://espn.go.
com/mlb/columns/bp/1427632.html: Alan Schwarz, One on One: Bob DuPuv, available at http://
www.baseballamerica.com/today/features/dupuy07OlO2.html ("All of our proposals are directed
at the issue of competitive balance.")
[Vol. 4:9
A GIANT WHIFF
increasingly necessary ingredient of on-field success." 6 From that con-
clusion, management determined that the disparity among team pay-
rolls had to be reduced. To reduce payroll disparity, management
employed two tools: (1) The Luxury Tax and (2) Revenue Sharing.
Table 1: Tax Rate by Times Exceeding Threshold (Percent)7
1st 2nd 3rd 4th
2003 17.5%
2004 22.5% 30%
2005 22.5% 30% 40%
2006 0% 40% 40% 40%
The luxury tax in the 2002 CBA was assessed according to the pay-
ment schedule listed in Table 1. The threshold for 2003 was $117.0
million; in 2004, it was $120.5 million: in 2005, it was $128.0 million;
and in 2006, it was $136.5 million."
The 2002 CBA revenue sharing system had two principal compo-
nents: The Base Plan and The Central Fund Component. 9 The Base
Plan was a "straight pool" plan, meaning that each team paid 34 per-
cent of its net local revenue into the pool, which was then distributed
evenly among all MLB teams. Roughly half of MLB teams gained
money under this scheme ("payee" teams) and the other half lost
money ("payor" teams). The Central Fund Component (CFC) was a
"split pool" plan that redistributed some of the league's Central Fund
revenues from high-revenue teams to low-revenue teams. MLB first
calculated the total sum of money transferred from "payor" teams to
"payee" teams under the Base Plan. MLB then set the total value of
the CFC at 41.066 percent of the sum transferred under the Base Plan.
The "payor" teams from the Base Plan contributed to the CFC in pro-
portion to the difference between their revenue and the league aver-
age revenue. The CFC was redistributed to payee teams in proportion
to the distance between the payee team's revenue and the league av-
erage revenue.' 0
6. Richard C. Levin, et al., The Report of the Independent Members of the Commissioner's
Blue Ribbon Panel on Baseball Economics (July 2000), 4, available at Pappas Database.
7. Id.
8. Maury Brown, Crystal Ball: The 2006 CBA and the Battle Within It in The Hardball Times
2006 Annual, 95
9. MLB Collective Bargaining Agreement, Article XXIV: The Revenue Sharing Plan, 101-2,
available at "Pappas Database," http://roadsidephotos.sabr.org/baseball/data.htm.
10. Associated Press. Four-Year Deal Includes Luxury Tax, No Contraction, available at http://
espn.go.com/mlb/news/2002/0830/1425253.html
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Table 2: Players' Share of Revenues"
Year Pct
1998 56%
1999 59%
2000 56%
2001 61%
2002 67%
2003 63%
2004 56%
2005 53%
As negotiations began in 2006, the owners indicated that they would
insist on more revenue sharing and a tougher luxury tax. Commis-
sioner Bud Selig pledged to transfer more money from high revenue
teams to low revenue teams. 12 Blue Jays President Paul Godfrey pro-
posed increasing the percentage of local revenue shared from 34 per-
cent to 50 percent.13 Because the MLBPA believes that the 2002
reforms lowered player salaries (see Table 2), it was adamantly op-
posed to any expansion of the current revenue sharing and luxury tax
regimes.' 4 There are four reasons why the 2002 reforms might have
lowered salaries. First, the luxury tax acted as a soft cap. It "signaled"
to owners a threshold above which payroll growth was not accept-
able' 5 and made any spending above that threshold significantly more
expensive.16 Second, by taking money from the rich teams and giving
it to the poor ones, the revenue sharing system hamstrung the big
spenders who drive salary growth.' 7 Third, the revenue sharing sys-
11. Peter Gammons, Teams Have Money to Burn, available at http://proxy.espn.go.com/espn/
print?id=229099&type =PackageStory
12. Maury Brown. Revenue Sharing, not Contraction, the Issue to Watch, available at http://
www.maurybrown.com/'?p=44
13. Dave Sheinin, It's Anyone's Baligame, Washington Post. March 29, 2006
14. Maury Brown. Opening Day Player Payroll: Inside the Numbers. The Hardball Times On-
line, available at http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/a-look-inside-the-2006-open-day-
payrolls. (Donald Fehr. Executive Director of the MLBPA, said, "I don't see a need for in-
creased revenue sharing").
15. Andrew Zimbalist, May the Best Team Win. 11-12. (Rangers' owner Tom Hicks pledged
that his team would never pay a luxury tax after the signing of the 2002 CBA).
16. Only three teams-the Yankees, Red Sox. and Angels-have exceeded the tax threshold
since 2002. Brown, Crvstal Ball in The Hardball Times 2006 Annual, 95
17. Andrew Zimbalist. Mayv the Best Team Win, 109. In the 2004-5 off-season, the Yankees
passed on top free agent Carlos Beltran. with the luxury tax and revenue sharing systems playing
crucial roles in the Yankees' decision. See Michael O'Keefe and T.J. Quinn, Yanks Losing at
Money Ball, New York Daily News. December 4. 2005; Dave Sheinin. Baseball's Financial Reins
Bringing Yankees to Heel. Washington Post. February 4. 2005
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tem reduced the marginal value of each player. Owners base free
agent contracts, in part, on the extra local revenue each player is ex-
pected to create.18 Economist Andrew Zimbalist estimated that high-
revenue teams faced a 39 percent marginal tax rate on each new dollar
of revenue under the 2002 CBA system, while low-revenue teams
faced an onerous 47 percent rate.19 Thus, if a player created $10 mil-
lion in pre-tax value for a franchise, the team netted between $5.3
million and $6.1 million for itself, reducing the marginal value of the
player. 20 Fourth, the MLBPA believed that low-revenue teams pocket
revenue sharing payments instead of using them to improve their
teams. 21
Despite its early negotiating stance, management did not push hard
for an expansion of the revenue sharing and luxury tax systems in the
CBA. 2 2 The new CBA lowers the marginal tax rate for each team
under the revenue sharing plan, but the total amount of money trans-
ferred from payor teams to payee teams will remain $326 million in
2007, the same as it was in 2006.23 In addition, the thresholds for trig-
gering the luxury tax will increase substantially for 2007, which may
temporarily exacerbate the payroll disparity gap.2 4 The owners appar-
ently determined that reducing payroll disparity was less important
18. Neil DeMause, Does Baseball Need a Salary Cap in Baseball Between the Numbers, 229
19. Zimbalist, May the Best Team Win 103
20. Id.
21. Maury Brown, Opening Day Player Payroll; Jeff Passan, Baseball Revenue Sharing De-
bated, The Kansas City Star, January 27, 2006 (Said Fehr, "There's an issue as to whether or not
clubs are using revenue-sharing receipts in an appropriate way").
22. Murray Chass, On Baseball: Negotiators Have Worked Out 5-Year Labor Deal, New York
Times, October 22, 2006. "Both sides had introduced proposals for significantly different ap-
proaches to the two major economic matters, but in the end they didn't get beyond the bargain-
ing table."
23. Maury Brown, The Ledger Domain: The New Collective Bargaining Agreement - Revenue
Sharing, available at http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=5668. The share
of local revenue paid into the Base Plan will drop to 31 percent. The most significant change
comes to the Split Pool plan for determining the Central Fund Component payouts. Instead of
determining the payor's contribution at the beginning of each year, the CBA sets a fixed rate at
the beginning of the agreement. In another change, each payee team will receive the same
amount of money from the Central Fund Component, provided that the payout does not put the
payee team above the revenue midpoint. "Because the amount each high-revenue team puts into
the split pool is unaffected by increasing revenues, as is the amount that each low-revenue team
receives from it (at least, until they approach that magic median), teams' effective marginal tax
rate-the amount of each new dollar of revenue they don't get to keep-drops from the old 39-
to-47% range down to just the new straight-pool rate of 31%.' Neil deMause. On the Margins:
New Revenue-Sharing Rules Should Spread The Wealth, But Not The Talent. available at http://
www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=5680.
24. "MLB, MLBPA Reach Five-Year Labor Accord," available at http://www.mlb.com. The
new thresholds will be $148 million in 2007, $155 million in 2008. $162 million in 2009, $170
million in 2010, and $178 million in 2011. Rates will continue at 22.5% for teams over the
threshold the first time, 30% for teams over the threshold the second time, and 40% for teams
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than ensuring the continuation of its $5.2 billion annual revenue
stream without a work stoppage.25
III. WHY FURTHER PAYROLL DISPARITY REDUCTION
IS UNNECESSARY
Table 3: Payroll Impact and Payroll Disparity
thru 200126
Year Impact Dispar.
1993 19.5% 30.4
1994 20.3% 26.3
1995 31.9% 27.8
1996 39.6% 31.4
1997 45.0% 33.9
1998 55.4% 37.5
1999 47.5% 44.5
2000 28.4% 39.3
2001 21.1% 37.9
To understand the importance of payroll disparity in the competi-
tive balance debate, we need to return to 2000. At the time the Blue
Ribbon Panel authors wrote in July 2000, MLB had witnessed a steady
increase in payroll disparity between 1994 and 1999 (see Table 3). The
standard deviation among payrolls in 1994 equaled 26.3 percent of the
league-average salary. By 1999, the standard deviation had increased
to 44.5 percent of the league-average salary. As a glaring symbol of
baseball's inequality, payroll disparity was attacked vociferously by
management. The revenue sharing system was designed to reduce dis-
parity by transferring money from high revenue teams to low revenue
teams. The luxury tax was also supposed to reduce payroll disparity
by limiting spending at the top. Management saw payroll disparity
reduction as a panacea, helping bad mid and low revenue teams
(MLRTs) re-build and giving good MLRTs a final push into champi-
onship contention.
over the threshold the third time. Clubs that paid the 40% rate in 2006 will pay the 40% rate in
2006 as well.
25. Associated Press, Baseball Plavers, Owners Reach Deal
26. See Zimbalist, supra note 15, at 44: Rodney Fort Database, supra note 4
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Management's narrow focus on payroll disparity blinded it to the
importance of payroll impact.2 7 Payroll impact measures the average
relationship between a team's payroll and a team's success. During
the peak years of competitive imbalance (1994-99), payroll impact was
also increasing. By 1998, payroll differences explained more than half
(55.4 percent) of the differences in winning percentage among teams
(up from 19.5 percent in 1993). Yet by the time CBA negotiations
began in 2002, the payroll impact figure had suddenly fallen to 21.1
percent. While the cause of this drop was uncertain, there was real-
world evidence of the trend. The Yankees' championship streak had
ended and the Oakland Athletics were coming off their third straight
postseason, despite payrolls averaging less than 60 percent of the
league mean. 28 Instead of analyzing why payroll size was becoming
less determinative, and perhaps creating rules to codify that develop-
ment, management dismissed this trend as "aberrational." 2 9 With its
inaction, management implied that payroll impact was beyond its
control.
That was a mistake. The revenue sharing system has not helped bad
MLRTs become good. The six smallest market teams-Indians, Reds,
Rockies, Royals, Brewers, and Pirates-have combined for just 2 win-
ning seasons (in 24 attempts) since the CBA's adoption.30 Meanwhile,
as well-run MLRTs were beginning to understand the inefficiencies in
the baseball talent market and how those inefficiencies constrained
the impact of team payroll on team success, management's strategy
looked even more suspect. While payroll disparity reduction advo-
cates were saying that MLRTs needed more money to bid on free
agents, smart MLRTs realized that they could build competitive teams
only by avoiding expensive free agents and exploiting market
inefficiencies.
Table 4 summarizes the payroll impact data for 2005.31 It shows the
actual payroll on opening day for each team and how many wins are
27. Although the BRP suggested several reforms that did not deal with payroll disparity re-
duction-such as amateur draft reform and a "competitive balance" draft among major league
players-management ignored them. See Alan Schwarz, Radical Changes Considered for Draft,
Baseball America, July 18, 2002
28. Rodney Fort Database, supranote 4
29. Updated Supplement to The Report of the Independent Members of the Commissioner's
Blue Ribbon Panel on Baseball Economics (December 2001). 7, available at Pappas Database
30. Nate Silver, Lies Damned Lies: The Hometown Discount, Baseball Prospectus Online,
available at http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=4441
31. This calculation is based on the marginal win formula adopted by Doug Pappas. The
premise of the Pappas formula is that a team with the league minimum payroll would still win 49
games. To calculate estimated wins based on opening-day payroll. I performed the following
steps:
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expected from a team with such a payroll. It also indicates the earned
payroll32 of each team, equaling the value that each team's opening
day roster produced (expressed in 2005 payroll dollars), 33 and the ac-
tual win total for each team in 2005.
Payroll impact is lower than management wants everyone to be-
lieve. Only seven teams (out of thirty) finished within 5 wins of their
payroll-expected performance. On average, payroll-expected per-
formance and actual performance differed by 10.9 wins. Similarly, the
earned payroll of the average team differed by almost one-third (32.4
percent) from its actual payroll. Therefore, if you are a fan of a team
with a league-average actual payroll of $73.1 million, all you can rea-
sonably expect is that your team will win between 70 and 92 games
and earn between $49.7 and $96.5 million.
The inefficiencies in the baseball talent market were analyzed in
Moneyball, the transformative book by Michael Lewis that introduced
America to Sabermetric analysis and Oakland GM Billy Beane. The
theory behind Moneyball is that "[t]he market for baseball players [i]s
so inefficient, and the general grasp of sound baseball strategy so
weak, that superior management c[an] still run circles around taller
piles of cash." 3 4 The theory that "better talent evaluation" can level
the playing field has been popularized in sports, business, and legal
literature.35
(1) Divided Marginal Payroll Dollars (total payroll dollars - [total players * league minimum
salary]) by Marginal Runs (see infra at n. 35 for discussion of marginal runs) to estimate the
Value of a Marginal Run.
(2) Divided each team's Marginal Opening Day Payroll (Opening Day Payroll - (Minimum
Salary)*(# of Players on Opening Day rosters)) by the Value of a Marginal Run to estimate
Expected Marginal Runs for each team.
(3) Divided Total Marginal Runs by Total Marginal Wins (equaling 2430 - (30)*(49) = 960) to
estimate how many Marginal Runs equal a Marginal Win.
Marginal Runs are an approximation for the overall value of an individual player.
Hitter MR = VORP + Davenport Defense Values (compared to league average)
Pitcher MR VORP
VORP = Value Over Replacement Player. It is the principal metric Baseball Prospectus uses to
measure the offensive contribution of a player. To incorporate the defensive contributions of a
player, a Hitter's MR combines VORP and the Davenport Defense Values (from Baseball Pro-
spectus) into one figure. The MR calculation, especially for hitters, is a rough approximation by
a very novice Sabermetrician (me). A more advanced Sabermetrician would probably have used
slightly different formulas to determine MR. All VORP and Davenport Defense data provided
by Baseball Prospectus Online, available at http://www.baseballprospectus.com.
32. See infra note 35
33. The cumulative actual payroll of the league equals the cumulative earned payroll of the
league. The earned payroll figure represents what each team's players should have been paid if
the players' compensation was determined solely by their 2005 performances.
34. Michael Lewis, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME, at 122
35. See, e.g. Brian McCormick, Small Market Teams Can Find Major League Baseball Success,
available at http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/23320/smallmarketteamscan-find-ma-
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Table 4: Opening Day and Earned Payrolls
Actual Payroll Earned Actual
Payroll Exp Ws Payroll Ws
STDEV $34.2 17.1 $17.3 10.8
Yankees $208.3 149 $87.1 95
Red Sox $123.5 106 $86.5 95
Mets $101.3 95 $73.5 83
Angels $97.7 93 $89.2 95
Phillies $95.5 92 $89.7 88
Cardinals $92.1 91 $93.2 100
Giants $90.2 90 $49.3 75
Mariners $87.8 88 $62.6 69
Cubs $87.0 88 $80.1 79
Braves $86.5 88 $85.6 90
Dodgers $83.0 86 $54.3 71
Astros $76.8 83 $95.7 89
White Sox $75.2 82 $94.9 99
Orioles $73.9 81 $68.5 74
Tigers $69.1 79 $60.3 71
Padres $63.3 76 $58.5 82
D-Backs $62.3 76 $63.1 77
Reds $61.9 75 $65.6 73
Marlins $60.4 75 $78.8 83
Twins $56.2 73 $82.2 83
Rangers $55.8 72 $72.0 79
Athletics $55.4 72 $81.3 88
Nationals $48.6 68 $71.4 81
Rockies $48.2 68 $53.9 67
Blue Jays $45.7 68 $78.3 80
Indians $41.5 65 $108.0 93
Brewers $39.9 65 $73.9 81
Pirates $38.1 64 $52.5 67
Royals $36.9 63 $33.5 56
D-Rays $29.7 59 $48.3 67
jorleague.html; Chris Isidore. Winning with a Hill of Beane, available at http://money.cnn.com/
2003/05/23/commentary/column-sportsbiz/sportsbiz/index.htm: Cass Sunstein. Market Efficiency
and Rationality: The Peculiar Case of Baseball, MICH. L. REv., May 2004
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The problem with a "better talent evaluation" theory is that high-
revenue teams can simply emulate the methods used by the most suc-
cessful low-revenue teams. In fact, the Red Sox, Blue Jays, Devil
Rays, Indians, Rangers, and Diamondbacks have new-wave general
managers and most teams now utilize some form of Sabermetric anal-
ysis. As Beane himself said, "The front offices no longer look like
good-old-boys clubs. They look like the Goldman Sachs arbitrage
desk." 3 6 Unless there is a structural reason why the Yankees don't
win 120 games every year, they should eventually stumble upon a
group of talent evaluators that allows them to do so.
Thankfully, there is. Management's obsession with reducing the
disparity among actual payrolls reflects an assumption that every pay-
roll dollar has equal purchasing power. A team may decide to waste
$100 million on the baseball equivalent of a speculative cattle deal,
but the equal purchasing power assumption posits that the team could
have invested the money in baseball's version of Microsoft. Even if
team payroll does not reflect the team's actual talent level, therefore,
it does reflect a team's capacity to purchase talent.
This assumption, however, is flawed. Because there are three mar-
kets for buying baseball players, not one, a team's actual payroll figure
is an inaccurate measurement of its capacity to purchase talent. To
borrow some terminology from economist Andrew Zimbalist, there is
the market for APPRENTICES, those players who have less than three
years of service time and whose salaries are set exclusively by the
teams. There are BUDDERS, those players who have between three
and six years of service time and whose salaries are set by indepen-
dent arbitrators.37 And there are MASTERS, those players who have
more than six years of service time and whose salaries are set by the
free-agent market.38 The actual payroll metric is merely a composite
figure that summarizes the total spending of each team, without differ-
entiating among expenditures in the three different markets.
Table 5 illustrates the dramatic differences in average performance
returns in the three markets. Masters are dramatically overpaid while
Budders and Apprentices offer strong average returns. 39 The average
Master was paid $5.00 million in 2005 and earned only $3.02 million, a
loss of 39.6 percent. For each marginal run that a Master created, his
36. Chris Isidore, Can Moneyball Survive, available at http://money.cnn.com/2005/12/02/com-
mentary/column-sportsbiz/sportsbiz/index.htm
37. "Super-2s"-the top 17 percent of players, in terms of service time, in the 2 to 3 year
service time category-are also eligible for arbitration.
38. See Andrew Zimbalist. Baseball and Billions, 41. Zimbalist uses the term "journeymen"
for the arbitration-eligible players: I refer to them as "Budders."
39. Service Time data collected from http://www.mlb4u.com
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team had to pay him $324,608. The average Budder was nearly twice
as good an investment, costing only $169,078 per marginal run, at an
average salary of $2.48 million. 40 Buying an Apprentice in 2005 was
like purchasing Google stock in 1995. An average investment of $0.38
million generated $2.08 million in value. These data indicate that us-
ing a team's actual payroll figure to estimate its talent-purchasing ca-
pabilities is like trying to decipher a person's wealth by adding francs,
lire, and deutschmarks without making a currency adjustment.
Table 5: Average and Earned Salary by Service Time
# Players Avg. Sal. 4 1  Earned Sal. Return $IMR
TOTAL 832 $2.63 $2.63 0.0% $199,482
Masters 312 $5,00 $3.02 -39.6% $324,608
Budders 206 $2.48 $2.89 16.6% $169,078
Apprentice 314 $0.38 $2.08 442.8% $38,124
The principal cause of this market dynamic is the asymmetry be-
tween a player's peak performance period and his market leverage. On
average, a player's best 7 seasons are those between the ages of 24 and
30.42 The average player is a rookie at age 24.4,43 meaning that he is
not a Master until the season in which he is 30.4. Therefore, a player's
best seasons, on average, occur in the years before he ever hits the
open market and earns his big payday. 44
Payroll impact-defined here as the relationship between a team's
actual payroll and a team's earned payroll-is influenced by two fac-
tors: ROSTER CONSTRUCTION (choosing the market in which to shop)
40. The average Budder with 5+ years of service time (closest to free agency) earned $225,386
per marginal run while the average Budder with 3 to 5 years earned $147,894 per marginal run.
Thus, even those players closest to free agency are 44 percent more efficient than their free agent
counterparts.
41. The numbers in the "Avg Sal" and "Earned Sal" categories are in millions
42. Nate Silver, Lies, Damned Lies: A New Look at Aging, Baseball Prospectus Online, avail-
able at http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=4464
43. Alan Schwarz, For Baseball Rookies, the Only Rush is to Judgment, New York Times,
September 4. 2005
44. The above analysis would indicate that the earned salary of Budders and Apprentices
should be higher than that of Masters, when, in fact, it is slightly lower. (And, in fact, the aver-
age Budder with 5+ years of service time does earn more ($3.65 million) than the average
Master). There are two reasons why the average Master earns more than the average Budder or
Apprentice. First, service time acts as a filtering device. The worst players spend only a few
years in the majors and never become Masters. Therefore, the Apprentices and Budders mar-
kets are replete with low-skill players who drag down the average salary for the market. Second,
while the average player is a rookie at age 24.4, the best players are rookies at 23.0. (The average
rookie age for "best players" compiled by looking at the average age of rookie status for the best
100 players in 2005, based on Marginal Runs). The best players, therefore, experience some of
their peak seasons as Masters.
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Table 6: Market Adjusted Payrolls
Market Market Roster Talent
Actual Adj. Adj. Exp. Constr. Eval.
Payroll Payroll Wins Rating Rating
STDEV $34.2 $15.0 7.5 32.1 23.9
Yankees $208.3 $129.4 109 62.1 67.3
Red Sox $123.5 $85.0 87 68.8 101.7
Mets $101.3 $75.7 82 74.7 97.1
Angels $97.7 $99.9 94 102.2 89.3
Phillies $95.5 $78.8 84 82.5 113.9
Cardinals $92.1 $74.3 82 80.7 125.4
Giants $90.2 $66.4 78 73.6 74.2
Mariners $87.8 $81.5 85 92.9 76.8
Cubs $87.0 $75.5 82 86.7 106.2
Braves $86.5 $76.0 83 87.8 112.7
Dodgers $83.0 $83.8 86 100.9 64.8
Astros $76.8 $79.7 85 103.7 120.1
White Sox $75.2 $70.5 80 93.8 134.5
Orioles $73.9 $73.0 81 98.8 93.8
Tigers $69.1 $66.3 78 95.9 90.9
Padres $63.3 $68.6 79 108.4 85.4
D-Backs $62.3 $62.4 76 100.0 101.2
Reds $61.9 $69.1 79 111.7 95.0
Marlins $60.4 $55.6 72 92.0 141.9
Twins $56.2 $74.8 82 133.2 109.9
Rangers $55.8 $89.1 88 159.5 80.8
Athletics $55.4 $70.7 80 127.6 115.0
Nationals $48.6 $59.5 74 122.5 120.0
Rockies $48.2 $68.2 78 141.7 79.0
Blue Jays $45.7 $63.4 76 138.7 123.5
Indians $41.5 $67.3 78 162.1 160.5
Brewers $39.9 $57.9 74 145.0 127.7
Pirates $38.1 $58.9 74 154.3 89.3
Royals $36.9 $53.6 71 145.2 62.5
D-Rays $29.7 $57.3 73 193.0 84.3
and TALENT EVALUATION (determining which players to select once
the market has been chosen). To determine which factor is more im-
portant, we must first estimate a team's market-adjusted payroll. A
team's market-adjusted payroll adjusts the team's actual payroll to ac-
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count for the amount of money a team spends in each of the three
markets. 45 If actual payroll aggregates francs, lire, and deutschmarks,
then the market-adjusted payroll translates these disparate currencies
into the common euro. The market-adjusted payroll is a better predic-
tor of team success than the actual payroll.
Whereas actual payroll predicts a team's success within 10.9 games on
average, market-adjusted payroll predicts team success within 7.9
games.
The last two columns of Table 6 reveal the importance of roster con-
struction and talent evaluation to a team's actual success. The roster
construction metric measures the relationship between a team's actual
payroll and its market-adjusted payroll (with 100 as the average). The
talent evaluation metric measures the relationship between a team's
market-adjusted payroll and its earned payroll (see Table 4). Despite
the popularity of the Moneyball theory, roster construction has a
greater influence on payroll impact than talent evaluation. Eleven of
the sixteen teams who exceeded their payroll-expected win perform-
ance had higher roster construction ratings than talent evaluation rat-
ings. The standard deviation of roster construction ratings (32.1) is
also higher than the standard deviation of talent evaluation ratings
(23.9), indicating that the impact of roster construction is greater. The
payroll impact metric is not simply a reflection of the range in skill
among MLB talent evaluators, but a structural feature of the game
based on the design of its talent markets.
This roster construction effect constrains the ability of high revenue
teams to "buy" championships. There may be three markets for buy-
ing baseball talent, but two of the three do not function like open
markets. Teams who decide to "increase payroll" in the off-season
generally must do so in the wildly inefficient Masters market. Every
time a team signs a Master, it loses an average of 39.6 percent on its
investment and incurs the opportunity cost of not having a Budder or
Apprentice in that roster spot, who return a combined 98.0 percent
profit on average. A look at the 2005 Giants and Blue Jays (see Table
6) demonstrates the importance of the roster construction effect. The
Giants' actual payroll was $90.2 million (expected 90 wins) while the
Blue Jays' actual payroll was $45.7 million (expected 68 wins). At first
glance, therefore, the fact that the Giants won 75 games and the Blue
Jays won 80 was a huge surprise. The market-adjusted payroll metric,
45. The adjustment works as follows: A team's payroll is divided into Masters Payroll, Bud-
ders Payroll, and Apprentices Payroll. Each of those sub-groups is multiplied by the average
return (see Table 5) for that market. Then, the three market-adjusted sub-groups are aggregated
to create the Market-Adjusted Payroll.
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however, tells a different story. Since the Giants dedicated 90.1 per-
cent of its payroll to Masters (league average = 71.2 percent) and the
Blue Jays dedicated only 27.6 percent to Masters, the two teams' mar-
ket-adjusted payrolls were nearly identical (Giants at $66.4 million;
Blue Jays at $63.4 million). Excessive reliance on Masters illustrates a
team's talent weakness as much as it signals that team's financial
strength.
Once market-adjusted payroll replaces actual payroll as the best in-
dicator of a team's capacity to purchase talent, the much-hyped pay-
roll disparity gap is cut in half. As Table 6 shows, the standard
deviation of actual payrolls is $34.2 million (17.1 expected wins). The
standard deviation of market-adjusted payrolls, on the other hand, is a
mere $15.0 million (7.5 expected wins). Whereas actual payrolls pre-
dict ten teams winning 88 games or more and eight teams winning
fewer than 70, market-adjusted payrolls place only three teams at or
above the 88-win mark and zero below 70 wins.46 Similarly, actual
payrolls put only seven teams within 5 games of the mean, but market-
adjusted payrolls place twenty teams in that median area. The
Yankees still have an enormous advantage over other teams (its mar-
ket-adjusted payroll puts the team at 109 wins), and a few other high
revenue teams certainly start with a decisive edge, but for the most
part, every team has a reasonable opportunity to be .500 on its own.
Management's belief that teams can rebuild through the free agent
market is misguided. While the current revenue sharing system en-
courages MLRTs to spend money on Masters, buying free agents, in
fact, is the worst re-building strategy for MLRTs. To over-achieve
their actual payroll, these teams must have high roster construction
and talent evaluation ratings. All of the top over-achievers in 2005-
the White Sox (68.6 percent of payroll spent on Masters), the Athlet-
ics (54.0 percent), the Indians (47.5 percent), and the Brewers (29.3
percent) 47-spent less than the league average on Masters. MLRTs
can only compete for championships when they first develop a nucleus
of good young players. Free agents can supplement this talent base,
but they cannot supplant it.
The efficiency of the Apprentices and Budders markets allows
MLRTs to be competitive, if they can develop young talent. Table 7
shows the ten "richest" teams, measured by total salary of Masters,
46. This is not to say that any individual season will witness only three teams winning more
than 88 games. Teams under and over perform each season, leading to a greater degree of
stratification. All it signifies is that inasmuch we can predict a team's record from its payroll, the
market-adjusted payroll data suggests a much narrower band of success than actual payroll data.
47. These percentages were calculated using the same data that was used for Table 6.
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Table 7: The Richest and the Smartest
Payroll Young
for Talent
TEAM Masters Ws TEAM (MR) Ws
Yankees $206.8 95 Indians 461.0 93
Red Sox $112.2 95 TWins 360.1 83
Mets $91.3 83 Athletics 355.2 88
Giants $81.2 75 Blue Jays 343.9 80
Angels $74.8 95 Brewers 307.6 81
Mariners $73.2 69 Astros 298.7 89
Phillies $71.5 88 White Sox 270.9 99
Cardinals $66.2 100 Rangers 270.3 79
Braves $62.6 90 Braves 265.5 90
Cubs $58.3 79 Phillies 248.3 88
and the ten "smartest," measured by marginal runs created by Bud-
ders and Apprentices. The ten "richest" teams averaged 86.9 wins;
the ten "smartest" averaged 87. Only seven of the "richest" teams
had records of .500 or better while nine of the "smartest" teams
reached the .500 mark. Both 2005 World Series teams-the White
Sox and the Astros-were among the "smartest" teams, but neither
was among the "richest."
IV. LEVERAGING EXISTING MARKET CONSTRAINTS TO
HELP MLRTs.
There are five conditions that allow MLRTs to become champion-
ship-caliber on a reasonably consistent basis. First, MLRTs must have
an equal opportunity to acquire the best amateurs. Second, MLRTs
must be able to keep their best young players for at least 6 years.
Third, those 6 years must be during the player's peak performance
period. Fourth, MLRTs must be able to complement their young stars
with free agents once they have developed their nucleus. Fifth,
MLRTs must be able to replenish their young talent when their stars
inevitably depart via free agency. The next CBA must ensure that all
five of these conditions are present. Otherwise, MLRTs will have a
difficult time building competitive teams and sustaining that success
over a reasonable period of time.
Some of these conditions are currently present. High-revenue
teams have no apparent advantage in collecting Apprentices and Bud-
ders. The team that spent the most money on Apprentices and Bud-
ders in 2005 was the once-contractible Twins ($39.3 million); the team
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that spent the least was the evil empire in the Bronx ($1.5 million).
Similarly, looking at Table 7, only two of the "richest" teams are also
among the "smartest."
Table 8: Comparison (in 2005 dollars)
199048 2005
Masters $4.43 $5.00
Budders $3.03 $2.48
Apprentices $0.60 $0.38
Apprentices and Budders have not always been so affordable. Ta-
ble 8 shows the relative salaries in each market in 1990 and 2005, using
2005 baseball dollars (in millions). In 1990, a Budder cost 68.3 percent
of a Master. In 2005, a Budder cost only 49.5 percent of a Master.
Similarly, in 1990, an Apprentice cost 13.5 percent of a Master, but in
2005, an Apprentice cost only 7.7 percent as much as a Master. The
changes in the market make it more affordable for MLRTs to keep
players until they reach free agency. These changes also suggest that
management overstated the importance of the payroll disparity trend
during the 2002 negotiations. If high revenue teams depend primarily
on Masters, who are becoming more expensive, and low revenue
teams depend primarily on Apprentices and Budders, who are becom-
ing less expensive, then increasing payroll disparity may simply have
been a product of the changing prices in each market, rather than an
upwards redistribution of talent.
A key explanation of this trend is the unwillingness of arbitrators to
award Budders the salary increases commensurate with those given to
Masters in free agency. 4 9 Many commentators once argued that arbi-
tration was a cause of salary inflation rather than a restraint on it.5o
Yet as Professor Roger Abrams points out in his book Money Pitch,
arbitration awards did not budge between 1995 and 1998.51 The stag-
nation has only grown stronger. Between 1994 and 1999, the average
arbitration award ($2.06 million) was 51.5 percent higher than the
league average salary. Between 2000 and 2005, the average award
($2.47 million) was only 3.6 percent higher than the league average. 52
48. ANDREW ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS, 83 (BasicBooks 1992)
49. See Roger Abrams, Money Pitch for a primer on the arbitration system
50. Jonathan Conti, The Effect of SalarY Arbitration on Major League Baseball, Sports Law-
yers Journal, Spring 1998. In their ill-fated salary cap plan during the 1994 strike, the owners
even proposed replacing arbitration with restricted free agency for players with 4 or more years
of service time, a move that almost certainly would have increased player salaries.
51. Roger Abrams. Money Pitch, 163
52. Arbitration award data collected from Pappas Database and MLB.com
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Despite these positive developments, three structural problems per-
sist, threatening the ability of MLRTs to compete for championships.
Unfortunately, management did little to ameliorate these problems in
the new CBA. First, the amateur draft does not always distribute the
best talent to the teams that pick highest. This occurs for two reasons.
Only players living in the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico are
subject to the draft, leaving a huge loophole for high revenue teams to
sign the best international talent.53 The idea of a worldwide draft was
accepted in principle by both parties during the last round of negotia-
tions, but the idea was never implemented. 54 The new CBA continues
to exempt foreign players from the draft, allowing the richest teams to
procure some of the most talented amateurs in the world. In addition,
some top amateurs make themselves un-draftable to MLRTs by de-
manding eight-figure signing bonuses and refusing to sign if their ask-
ing price is unmet. After the J.D. Drew and Rick Ankiel fiascos in
1997, MLRTs in the Top 5 stopped taking the best players and started
taking the most signable ones.55 Astros Manager Phil Garner calls
this phenomenon the "silent killer" because "franchises that have to
go on signability are, by definition, the ones that can't sign free agents
of any large magnitude." 56 In response, MLB initiated an "informal"
slotting system, where management "suggests" proper signing bonuses
for each draft slot and rebukes those teams that exceed them.5 7 For-
malizing the slotting system in this CBA would have been beneficial
for competitive balance, but it did not occur. 8 The new CBA did in-
53. See Alan Schwarz, Radical Changes Considered for Draft, BASEBALL AMERICA, July 18,
2002
54. Id.
55. See Jayson Stark, Big Bonuses Bad News for Bad Teams, available at http://espn.go.com/
mlb/columns/stark/560245.html, (describing how the then-Expos used the 5th pick in the draft on
a player who was not in Baseball America's Top 100)
56. Jim Molony. Trading Picks Would Reshape Draft, June 8. 2005. available at http://mlb.mlb.
com/NASApp/mlb/news/article.jsp?vmd=20050608&contentid=1081823&vkey=draft2005&fext
=.jsp
57. Allan Simpson, Bonus Concerns Created the Draft; Yet Still Exist, available at http://www.
baseballamerica.com/today/2005draft/050604bonus.html. This informal system has been reason-
ably successful.
58. Keith Law. New CBA Overview. available at http://insider.espn.go.com/espn/blog/index?
name=lawkeith (Entry Posted on October 25, 2006). Despite management's recent success in
controlling bonuses, loopholes still exist. Top players who are perceived as unsignable can still
force low revenue teams to pass over them. See Russell Adams, 'Signability and 'Value' Rule
MLB Draft. Sports Business Journal, June 14, 2004. In addition, MLB exempts from scrutiny
expensive bonuses given to two-sport athletes (because they have more negotiating leverage)
and to players later in the signing process ("So long as you don't impact another team's pick, the
commissioner's office usually won't have as much of a problem."). Simpson, Bonus Concerns.
Players would benefit from a formal slotting program because they could use it as a bargaining
chip to either get concessions elsewhere or regularize the amount of money going to amateur
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stitute some reforms to deal with the problem of "signability." Teams
that fail to sign a first or second round draft pick will receive the same
pick in the subsequent draft as compensation. 59 This change gives the
teams more leverage by lowering the cost of not signing a draft pick.
In addition, all draft picks, aside from college seniors, will now face an
August 15th deadline for signing.60 This rule prevents draft picks from
holding out indefinitely until the team capitulates.
Second, some MLRTs are unable to develop their young stars con-
currently and are failing to capture their young stars' peak perform-
ance years. Most MLRTs concede that they cannot keep their young
stars once they become free agents. Successful MLRTs, therefore,
rely on a concurrent star strategy.61 The concurrent star strategy has
two components, the "concurrent" part and the "star" part, which are
often at odds with each other. On the one hand, MLRTs need multi-
ple young stars in order to win championships and they maximize the
number of years their stars play together by quickly promoting top
prospects to join their star Apprentices and Budders. On the other
hand, since players tend to peak between the ages of 24 and 30, pro-
moting talented 20-year olds wastes precious service time on below-
peak performance. 62
The Devil Rays are a good example of the quandary that MLRTs
face. Coming into 2006, they were a projected 69-win team63 with a
strong nucleus of young players, most of whom are 3 to 4 years from
free agency. They also had two of baseball's best prospects in B.J.
Upton and Delmon Young. Part I of the concurrent star strategy
would have advised the Rays to promote Upton and Young to start
draft picks each year (similar to the NFL's rookie salary pool). Players' Associations in other
sports have been willing to limit rookie salaries in exchange for concessions elsewhere. See
Derek Zumsteg. Breaking Balls: Draft Slotting, Baseball Prospectus Online, November 10. 2003,
available at http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=2453
59. Kevin Goldstein, Future Shock: The CBA and the Draft, available at http://www.baseball
prospectus.com/article.php?articleid=5677
60. Id.
61. The Indians executed a concurrent star strategy in the 1990s by signing its young stars to
long-term contracts after their first or second years, offering the players security in exchange for
delaying free agency. The Indians are again employing that strategy. See Cleveland Locks Up
Another Youngster in Sizemore, available at http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/storyid=
2388456. Other teams successfully following the concurrent star model are the Brewers and
Diamondbacks. See Baseball Prospectus 2006, 13-15 & 260-62
62. See Baseball Prospectus 2006, 209-11 Marc Topkin, Changes Needed, Hands Tied, St. Pe-
tersburg Times, May 23, 2004 ("ESPN's Peter Gammons says that the Rays made a mistake in
bringing up (Carl) Crawford and (Rocco) Baldelli too early because 'when their next group of
young players are ready, those two will be too expensive and on their way out.'")
63. Nate Silver, Lies, Damned Lies: PECOTA Breaks Hearts, BASEBALL PROSPECI US ON-
LINE. available at http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=4917
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the season, add some players in free agency over the next two off-
seasons, and hope for a strong playoff run in 2008. Part II of the con-
current star strategy, the "star" part, would have advised the Rays to
keep the 19-year old Young and 21-year old Upton 64 in the minors for
a few more years, so that their six years with the Rays are their six
most productive in the majors.
The Rays decided to delay their promotions until late 2006.65 The
costs of a system in which teams are forced to make this choice are
immense. First, the delayed promotion strategy hurts the team's
short-term success and threatens the viability of a concurrent star
strategy. Second, the delay hurts the team's relationship with its
young stars. 66 Third, the financial impact on the players is devastat-
ing. A player who spends two extra years in Triple A will earn ap-
proximately $500,000 less than if he had spent those seasons in the
major leagues. 67 The player's arbitration and free agent eligibility is
also delayed another two years, costing him millions of dollars. The
current system is inefficient, hurting the best prospects and best-run
teams alike.
A simple reform could alleviate the problem: Every day of major
league service for players under the age of 23 counts as 1/2 day for free
agent eligibility and 2/3 days for arbitration eligibility. Let's take the
21-year old Upton as an example. Under the current system, if Upton
were brought up at the beginning of 2006, he would be a free agent in
six years at age-27 and arbitration-eligible in three years at age-24.
Under the reformed system, Upton could have played in the majors
for all of 2006, been arbitration-eligible at age-23 (the 2 years of ser-
vice will count as 3 years for arbitration eligibility) and still have been
a free agent at age-28.
If this new system encourages teams to promote players a year ear-
lier, the player benefits financially. Even if the Rays did promote
Upton at the same age under both systems, he would lose very little
money.68 The advantage for low revenue teams is also apparent.
64. Ages as of Opening Day 2006
65. Steve Phillips. Save Upton, Young for Their Prime Years, available at http://proxy.espn.go.
com/espn/print?id=2152303&type=story
66. Frustrated by the team's failure to promote him last September, Young lashed out, calling
the team "cheap" and expressing his intention to -[g]et (his) six years and leave." Associated
Press, Devil Rays Prospect Claims Franchise is 'Cheap', available at http://sports.espn.go.com/
print?id=2159942&type=Story.Young was suspended in early 2006 for flipping his bat at an
umpire.
67. The minimum major league salary is $327,000 in 2005. The average Triple A salary is
around $75,000. See http://www.mlb4u.com/pcontracts.php
68. In his first seven years in the majors, Upton would be trading one year as an Apprentice
and one year as a Master for two years as a Budder. If we assume that a star like Upton would
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Team-player relations would not deteriorate. The Rays would have
Upton on their major league team for 7 years instead of 6. The team
would improve in the short-term and would have more flexibility to
execute a concurrent star strategy. Even if Upton ends up earning $10
million a year from arbitrators in the last two years before free
agency, the Rays will probably be able to afford it. If the Devil Rays
are a championship-caliber team during those years, they will have the
revenue to pay the $20 million. If not, they can trade him. 6 9 Unfortu-
nately, the CBA includes zero provisions dealing with this important
problem.
Third, MLRTs are not adequately compensated for the loss of star
players in free agency. The draft pick compensation package for the
best free agents is wholly inadequate. Therefore, the best GMs like
Billy Beane usually trade their star Budders for prospects and Ap-
prentices before the Budders reach free agency. This strategy is as-
tute, given the current rules, but it exacts a serious cost on an MLRT's
ability to execute a successful concurrent star strategy. Condition
#2- that MLRTs must be able to keep their best young players for at
least 6 years-is inherently at odds with Condition #5-that MLRTs
must be able to replenish their young talent when their stars inevitably
depart via free agency. Two case studies illustrate the costs.
In 2003, the Royals surprised the baseball world, winning 83 games
and challenging for the AL Central title.70 Their best player, Carlos
Beltran, was eligible for free agency after the 2004 season, but the
Royals wanted to make a playoff run in 2004 and did not trade him
during the off-season. The plan failed, as the Royals stumbled out of
the gate, en route to 104 losses.71 By the time the Royals decided to
trade Beltran in June, the market was weak. Everyone knew that the
Royals had to trade Beltran, because they could not afford to give him
$100 million and the draft pick compensation package was meager.
With no leverage, the Royals settled for a mediocre package of play-
ers, none of whom is expected to be much better than average.
earn twice the average of a player at his service time level as a Budder and a Master, he would
only lose $460,000 over the course of the seven years. One year as Star Master ($10M) + One
year as Apprentice ($0.38 M) - TwNo Years as Star Budder ($9.92 M)
69. What cripples the MLRTs' ability to keep its star players is not the annual salary per se,
but the long-term commitment (i.e. $72 million over 6 years) to a player soon to be past his peak,
especially when the team does not know if it will be successful enough during the life of the
contract to pay for it.
70. See http://ww .esm.psu.edu/~ajml38/baseball/bbstat.php?year=2003
71. See http://mlb.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/standings/final 2004.jsp
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The 2006 Oakland Athletics were a World Series contender. 72 One
of their top starting pitchers, Barry Zito, is a free agent at the end of
2006 and nobody expects the team to re-sign him. Beane needed Zito
to make a World Series run, but he also wants to keep the team com-
petitive in the next few seasons.73 The significance of the Athletics
considering a Zito trade during a championship run is immense. It
indicates that MLRTs only enjoy their stars' services for five years,
rather than six, and it suggests that MLRTs are stuck in perpetual re-
building mode, cyclically dealing their stars for prospects before they
can produce a championship.
MLRTs should be able to make championship runs and receive rea-
sonable compensation for their best players. The free agent compen-
sation system does a poor job of differentiating between great and
decent players. Under the 2002 CBA system, the Elias Sports Bureau
divides players into four categories, based on statistics from the previ-
ous two years. Teams who lose Type A players (the top 30 percent at
their position) as free agents receive the signing team's first-round
pick as well as a "sandwich" first-round pick (in between first and
second rounds). 74 Teams who lose Type B players (31 to 50 percent at
their position) receive the signing team's first-round pick. Teams who
lose a Type C player (51 to 60 percent at their position) receive a
"sandwich" second-round pick.
This system is absurd. Using 2005 Marginal Runs created as a
model, both Derrek Lee (108.6 MR) and Jeromy Burnitz (17.3 MR)
are Type A players. The average player in the second half of the first
round75 earns roughly 12 MR per year during his first six years in the
majors.76 While such compensation is reasonable, or even excessive,
for Type B and mediocre Type A players, it is wholly insufficient for
the top stars.
A better system would differentiate between star players and aver-
age ones. The Type A category should be divided into A-1 (top 5
72. Peter Gammons, Early Season Team Developments, available at http://insider.espn.go.com/
espn/blog/index?name=gammons-peter (Entry Posted on April 21, 2006)
73. Peter Gammons, Predicting a Yankees-Cards Series (Entry Posted on April 2. 2006)
74. Baseball America (Frequently Asked Questions), available at http://www.baseballamerica.
com/today/help/faq.html.
75. If the signing team's pick is in the first half of the first round, the signing team gives the
former team its second-round pick. Thus, an analysis of the value of late first round picks offers
a good estimation of the pick's value.
76. MR data extrapolated from Nate Silver, Lies Damned Lies: Valuing Draft Picks. BASE-
3ALL PROSPECTS ONI INE, available at http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid
=4368. Silver provided the data in terms of WARP (wins above replacement player). 1.16
WARP (the average seasonal value of a player drafted in the second half of the first round) is
roughly equivalent to 12 MR.
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percent), A-2 (6 to 15 percent), and A-3 (16 to 30 percent) players.
The base compensation for all three Type A groups would still be a
first-rounder from the signing team and a sandwich first-round pick.
In addition, however, teams who lose A-1 players should receive an
additional two first-round picks. These picks would be supplied by
MLB-not the signing team-and would fall in the middle of the first-
round in two successive years. Teams who lose A-2 players would re-
ceive one mid first-round pick in the next draft. Teams who lose A-3
players would receive only the current base compensation.77
The new CBA did make changes to the compensation system, but
did not increase compensation for the loss of top-tier free agents. In-
stead, the new CBA eliminates compensation for Type C free agents
and changes the compensation for Type B free agents to a "sandwich"
first-round pick (not from signing team).78 It also re-defines Type A
players as those in the top quintile (20 percent) at each position and
Type B players as those in the second quintile at each position. 79 The
failure to increase compensation for the best sliver of players forces
contending MLRTs to face the difficult conundrum of either losing a
top player without stellar compensation or damaging its ability to win
championships during its "window" of contention.
A better compensation system would still not help MLRTs keep
their franchise players in free agency. For fans of these low revenue
teams, losing a franchise player can be "alienating."s 0 Baseball Pro-
spectus author Nate Silver has an excellent idea to address this prob-
lem: the Hometown Discount.' Under this system, MLB would pay a
percentage (25 percent for small market teams, scaling down to 5 per-
cent for the big market teams) of the salary of any free agent player
who re-signs with his "hometown" team, the team with whom he has
played with for at least the last three years. 82 Thus, if Jason Bay is
worth $80 million over 6 years on the market, the Pirates only have to
77. The purpose of this reform is to benefit mid and low revenue teams. To that end, high
revenue teams who add a star player during a pennant race and lose him in free agency should
not receive all the draft picks, even if they parted with top prospects to get the star. The team
who rents a star and then loses him in free agency should only receive the base compensation
picks that are part of the current CBA, but not the additional picks added in this reform.
78. Keith Law, New CBA Overview, available at http://insider.espn.go.comlespn/blog/index?
name=law keith (Entry Posted on October 25, 2006).
79. Id.
80. Nate Silver, Lies Damned Lies: The Hometown Discount, BASEBALL PROSPE( rus ON-
LINE, available at http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=4441
81. Id.
82. Id.
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pay $60 million, with MLB picking up the rest of the tab.8 3 Regret-
fully, the CBA did not adopt the Hometown Discount or an
equivalent measure in the current CBA.
V. A CLOUDY GOAL LEADS TO A MISGUIDED REVENUE
SHARING PLAN
In 2000, the conclusion of the Blue Ribbon Panel's report seemed
clear enough: "LARGE AND GROWING REVENUE DISPARITIES EXIST
AND ARE CAUSING PROBLEMS OF CHRONIC COMPETITIVE IMBAL-
ANCE." 8 4 The term "competitive balance," however, is not self-ex-
planatory. The BRP defined "competitive balance" as a system in
which "every well-run club has a regularly recurring reasonable hope
of reaching postseason play." 5 This is a sound definition. It places a
condition on team success-being a "well-run club"-and defines an
acceptable range of outcomes when this condition is met-"regularly
recurring reasonable hope of reaching postseason play."
Despite this clear formulation, many in the management hierarchy
never got the message. They continue to speak of competitive balance
as if it were synonymous with league-wide parity. "The goal. . .[is to]
ensure that even more than 20 clubs at Labor Day still have a chance
to compete for playoff spots," said Bob DuPuy, chief negotiator for
Major League Baseball.86 "[The system] will work 100 percent when
every team at the beginning of April will feel like [it] has a shot at the
playoffs," said Paul Godfrey, President of the Blue Jays. 87 -This sport
has more parity than it's ever had. We don't have to take a back seat
to anybody in terms of parity," said Commissioner Selig.88
The revenue sharing formula reflects the unstated decision to pri-
oritize parity over the BRP's definition of competitive balance. First,
the formula does not mandate that teams are "well-run" before they
83. The money would be deducted from the team's local revenue sharing payments each year.
The Pirates are one of the six "smallest" market teams under Silver's classification. Id.
84. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, BLUE RIBBON PANEL, 1 (2000). The Commissioner's hired
hands were not alone in their concerns. Respected sports announcer Bob Costas, often a caustic
critic of baseball owners, penned a book chronicling the competitive imbalance problem and
suggesting remedies. See Bob Costas, Fair Ball: A Fan's Case for Baseball. The perception of a
problem was so acute that it became a topic of discourse among academics. See, e.g., Andrew
Borteck, The Faux Fix: Why a Repeal of Major League Baseball's Antitrust Exemption Would
Not Solve Its Severe Competitive Balance Problems, Cardozo Law Review, February 2004; An-
drew Zimbalist, May the Best Team Win
85. Id at 5.
86. Maury Brown, Opening Day Player Payroll: Inside the Numbers, The Hardball Times On-
line, http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/a-look-inside-the-2006-open-day-payrolls
87. Id.
88. Associated Press, Baseball Players and Owners Reach Deal
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receive revenue sharing payments. A system reflecting this approach
would provide more funding to teams that have shown an ability to
spend its resources wisely. Under a parity approach, on the other
hand, equality is the goal, so payments are based solely on financial
need. Second, the current system disperses the same amount of
money to recipient teams each year-assuming that the team's reve-
nue position has not changed-rather than target money to teams who
are on the cusp of playoff contention. This formula reflects the pro-
parity assumption that revenue sharing should help bad MLRTs be-
come mediocre before it helps good MLRTs become great.
According to Commissioner Selig, "[t]here is no question that the
[current] system is working."8 9 From a parity perspective, however,
there is little difference between the pre-CBA and post-CBA years.90
From 2003 to 2005, there were three different NL champions and
three different AL champions. From 1998 to 2002, there were also
five distinct NL champions. The Yankees are less dominant than they
were during the pre-CBA period, when they won four AL champion-
ships, but that is due to a sub-par pitching staff, not sub-par finances. 91
From 2000 to 2002, 13 different teams made the postseason; in the
three years after the adoption of the CBA, 14 different teams made
it.92 The standard deviation of team winning percentages in the three
pre-CBA years (2000-02) was .077; in the three post-CBA years (2003-
05), it was .078.9
The real problem is not the stagnancy of the parity indicators, how-
ever, but instead the obsession with parity itself. The 2005-06 off-
season illustrated the problems with the current system. Flush with
money from the revenue sharing system, the low-revenue Royals in-
creased their payroll by $17.6 million (a 35 percent increase from
2005).94 The Royals' spending spree netted six veterans95 who created
68.2 Marginal Runs last year. The team could have expected 5 to 6
additional wins in 2006 f the players repeated their 2005 perform-
89. Hal Bodley, Baseball's Payroll Gap Narrows, USA TODAY, April 5. 2006
90. For an alternative view, see Dave Sheinin, It's Anyone's Baligame, WASHINGTON POST,
March 29, 2006
91. The Yankees' payroll index (with 100 as league average) was 177.0 pre-CBA and 254.6
post-CBA. Data Collected from Rodney Fort Database, available at http://www.rodneyfort.com/
SportsData/BizFrame.htm
92. MLB Postseason History, http://mlb.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/history/postseason/mlb
ds.jsp
93. Data collected from Rodney Fort Database, available at http://www.rodneyfort.com/Sports
Data/BizFrame.htm
94. Brown, supra note 86
95. The six players are Reggie Sanders, Mark Grudzielanek, Doug Mientkiewicz. Joe Mays.
Scott Elarton, and Mark Redman (via trade).
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ances. 96 Meanwhile, the low-revenue Indians increased their payroll
by $14.5 million, but a huge chunk of that money went to salary in-
creases for their young stars. The team had three off-season goals: (1)
keep ace starter Kevin Millwood (or find a comparable pitcher); (2)
add a closer; and (3) upgrade production from their corner IF and OF.
Hamstrung by payroll constraints, the Indians came up empty on all
three. And their pitching staff has suffered as a result, sporting a 4.41
ERA in 2006 (6th in the AL) after leading the league with a 3.61 ERA
in 2005.97
The Royals won 58 and 56 games in 2004 and 2005. The Indians
won 93 games in 2005. If the revenue sharing system can add 5 wins
to an MLRT, shouldn't those wins go to a team like the Indians-for
whom extra 5 wins can make the difference between second place and
the playoffs-rather than the Royals-for whom 5 extra wins are
meaningless? The actions of MLRTs indicate that they think so. The
Marlins cut payroll to the bone in 1998. Only when they developed a
core of young stars did the Marlins add free agents like Ivan Rodri-
guez and Ugueth Urbina. This strategy helped win a World Series in
2003. The architect of the 2003 team, Larry Beinfest, understands that
additional wins have a higher marginal value for contending teams
and that "[t]here is no real difference between losing 95 and 105
games."98
In recent years, successful MLRTs have staggered their payrolls,
spending more (relative to the league average) when they have a
chance to be competitive and spending less when they do not. The
Indians cut payroll from 2002 to 200499, and only began adding payroll
once they became a playoff contender. The Blue Jays, who were given
$210 million to spend over three years before the 2005 season, decided
to spend $50 million in 2005, $72 million in 2006, and (presumably)
$88 million in 2007.100 The Marlins, employing the "cut to the bone"
strategy again in 2006, shocked the baseball world by remaining in
96. An approximate win-value for 68.2 Marginal Runs
97. ESPN, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlbhist/stats/aggregatestatType=pitching&group=9&
seasonType=2&type=typel&sort= ERA&split=)&season=2005
98. Peter Gammons, Marlins Building Pennant Contender (April 15,2006), http://insider.espn.
go.com/espn/blog/indexname=gammons-peter
99. Data collected from Rodney Fort Database, available at http://www.rodneyfort.com/Sports
Data/BizFrame.htm
100. See Daniel Pauling, The Blue Jays Have a Chance, available at http://www.athomeplate.
com/bluejayschance06.sthtml; payroll data collected from Rodney Fort Database. Even the
MLBA approves of the payroll staggering strategy. See Gammons, Marlins Building Pennant
Contender ("(This is) Gene Orza's model when he opposed a floor to spending because he ap-
preciated that sometimes small-market teams need to take payroll to the bottom to build back
for a run at the top.")
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playoff contention into September. An unwillingness to stagger the
payroll can actually have detrimental effects on a team's re-building
process. As Peter Gammons wrote, regarding the Royals' off-season,
"Why tie up Sanders, Grudzielanek, and Mientkiewicz and still lose
95-110 games instead of developing young players?" 01 Gammons
was right. The Royals finished a putrid 31-56 in the first half. After
firing their General Manager, Allard Baird, and putting younger play-
ers in their lineup, they have fought to a slightly more respectable 31-
44 in the second half.
A revenue sharing system that steers money to playoff-caliber
MLRTs would generate more revenue than the current system. While
research has shown that every additional win increases team reve-
nue,102 the relationship between wins and team revenue is not lin-
ear.10 3 Fans are more likely to buy tickets to a game that has a
measurable impact on a team's chances of making the postseason.10 4
Since teams profit handsomely from postseason appearances, the most
valuable regular-season wins are those that most increase the
probability of reaching the postseason. 05 "Revenue takes a sharp
turn upward at about 85 wins when the sweet spot kicks in but slows
down at about 95 wins, when additional wins become superfluous."10 6
A revenue sharing system that increases payments when a team is ex-
pected to be in the "sweet spot" will generate more revenue for
MLRTs than the current system.107
A revamped revenue sharing system also increases player salaries,
because teams in the sweet spot are willing to pay more for a free
agent than teams outside the sweet spot. This is what consultant
Vince Gennaro refers to as "last piece of the puzzle" economics. 108
Gennaro points to the Mets' signing of Billy Wagner as an example. If
the Mets were a 74-win team, adding a projected 6-win player'0 9 like
101. Id.
102. Nate Silver, Is Alex Rodriguez Overpaid? in Baseball Between the Numbers. 188
103. Vince Gennaro, Measuring the Dollar Value of a Player: Part 1. The Hardball Times On-
line, http://www.hardbalitimes.com/main/article/measuring-the-dollar-value-of-a-player-part-1
104. Id.
105. Silver, Is Alex Rodriguez Overpaid?
106. Id. at 193
107. See Nate Silver, Lies, Damned Lies: The Tiger Plan Revisited, BASEBALL PROSPECTUS
ONLINE, available at http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=4412. A team that
wins 75, 84, 95, 88, & 70 games in a five-year stretch generates more revenue, on average, than a
team that wins 83, 82, 85, 79, & 83 games, even though each teams wins 412 games during the
stretch.
108. Vince Gennaro, Player Value: The Last Piece of the Puzzle. The Hardball Times Online,
http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/player-value-the-last-piece-of-the-puzzle
109. Id. A "6-win" player is expected to add 6 additional wins to a team that currently has a
replacement-level player at his position.
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Wagner (giving the Mets 80 wins) would be worth $6.4 million. Ad-
ding Wagner to an 82-win team would be worth $8.6 million, while
adding Wagner to an 89-win team is worth $10.6 million, roughly what
the Mets paid Wagner last off-season.11
My revenue sharing reform proposal involves an adjustment to the
current formula.111 As Part I describes, the current revenue sharing
system has two main parts: The Base Plan and the Central Fund Com-
ponent. Under my proposed reform, the only difference would be in
how the Base Plan is calculated; the Central Fund Component would
remain unchanged. The current Base Plan formula is a simple
"Straight Pool" plan. Teams pay 34 percent of their local revenue
(now, 31 percent under the new CBA) into the pool, which is then
dispersed equally among the 30 MLB teams. Table 9 shows the cur-
rent revenues and net receipts/payments under the current plan, with
net payors above the black line and net payees below it.112 Under my
system, teams would still pay 34 percent of their local revenue into the
Base pool. 13 Instead of dispersing the Base pool equally, however, a
team's share would be adjusted upwards or downwards based on its
Success Multiplier. The Success Multiplier measures a team's likeli-
hood of playoff contention for the following year.114 A team with a
Multiplier greater than 1 (shaded dark gray)
110. Id.
111. The advantage of using the current formula as a baseline is purely political; it is less
disruptive to the negotiating process if the two sides do not need to develop an entirely new
formula. For discussion of more extensive reforms, see Neil DeMause, Does Baseball Need a
Salary Cap? In BASEBALL BETWEEN THE NUMBERS, 233-34.
112. These numbers are an adjusted version of the revenue estimates provided by Forbes.
Revenue Data from Forbes Magazine, available at http://www.forbes.com/lists/2006/04/17/06mlb
baseball valuations land.html. The Forbes revenue estimates include the revenue sharing pay-
ments and receipts for each team. To estimate the impact of a new revenue sharing system, I
adjusted the Forbes projections to reflect team revenues before revenue sharing.
113. For purposes of this formula, I estimated that 80 percent of league-wide revenue was
locally generated. The 1999 data provided by the BRP indicated that 86.7 percent of revenue
was locally generated. Blue Ribbon Panel, 15-17. The 2001 updated data from the BRP indi-
cated that 78.9 percent of revenue was locally generated. Blue Ribbon Panel Supplement, 12-14.
114. A team's success multiplier is based on a weighted average of its 3-year winning percent-
age. The weighted winning percentage for 2006 = (60%*2005 Win%)+ (30%*2004 Win%)+
(10%*2003 Win%). The Success Multiplier = 1+(4*(Weighted Win%-.500))
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Table 9: Impact of Reformed Revenue Sharing
Est. Rev Success Success Mkt
Est. Rev. Shar Multiplier Adj. Size"1
Yankees $345.7 -$75.9 1.40 $0.0 262
Red Sox $236.2 -$34.5 1.37 $0.0 155
Mets $219.6 -$28.2 0.92 -$1.8 244
Dodgers $210.6 -$24.8 0.95 -$0.4 175
Cubs $195.5 -$19.1 1.05 $3.7 105
Mariners $195.5 -$19.1 0.72 -$10.4 112
Phillies $191.0 -$17.3 1.15 $8.2 130
Astros $186.4 -$15.6 1.21 $10.9 86
Braves $184.9 -$15.1 1.29 $14.3 102
Giants $183.4 -$14.5 1.03 $3.1 84
Angels $177.4 -$12.2 1.28 $0.0 147
Cardinals $174.4 -$11.1 1.47 $21.8 56
Padres $163.8 -$7.1 1.02 $2.4 45
White Sox $156.3 $0.7 1.29 $14.3 90
Orioles $154.6 $1.5 0.85 -$4.8 124
Rangers $149.5 $4.0 1.00 $1.9 103
Indians $144.3 $6.4 1.14 $7.6 84
Tigers $137.4 $9.7 0.69 -$11.6 95
D-Backs $135.7 $10.6 0.73 -$10.1 64
Rockies $135.7 $10.6 0.68 -$12.1 59
Nationals $135.7 $10.6 0.90 -$2.6 78
Reds $122.0 $17.2 0.81 -$6.3 69
Blue Jays $120.3 $18.0 0.90 -$2.8 96
Athletics $116.8 $19.6 1.22 $10.9 61
Brewers $111.7 $22.1 0.87 -$4.0 39
Pirates $101.4 $27.1 0.71 -$10.6 54
Marlins $91.1 $32.0 1.07 $4.6 95
Royals $87.6 $33.6 0.46 -$21.3 38
D-Rays $85.9 $34.5 0.67 -$12.5 87
Twins $82.5 $36.1 1.13 $7.4 69
would receive more than 1/30 of the pool; a team with a Multiplier
under 1 (shaded white) would receive less than 1/30.116
There is, however, an exception to the rule. Teams who exceed the
luxury tax threshold at any point in the previous three years are ineli-
115. DeMause, Does Baseball Need a Salary Cap?, In BASEBALL BElWEEN THE LINES 232
116. A team's recipient share = (Success Multiplier)/30
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gible for a Success Adjustment. Since the Yankees, Red Sox, and An-
gels (shaded light gray) all exceeded the threshold in the prior three
years, their $45.1 million in Success Adjustments are dispersed evenly
among the 27 other teams.
This reform would help ensure that "every well-run club has a regu-
larly recurring reasonable hope of reaching postseason play." 117 Com-
petitive teams are given money to purchase free agents who can spark
a championship run. Uncompetitive teams, meanwhile, have the
proper incentive to invest in the young talent that will make them
competitive and bring them greater revenue sharing payments. In ad-
dition, while the current system penalizes success, with a high margi-
nal tax on additional revenue, the reformed system gives teams a
financial incentive to succeed."" The system will funnel money to
teams for whom an extra 5 wins is financially valuable, thereby, lead-
ing to higher salaries. The reform has benefits for management as
well. It "hardens" the luxury tax by exacting a severe penalty for non-
compliance with the stated thresholds. Under this system, it is un-
likely that any team, aside from the Yankees, would exceed the
threshold.
VI. CONCLUSION
Management should be lauded for abandoning its mission to reduce
payroll disparity, thereby ensuring labor peace. The joy of fans, how-
ever, should not obscure the failure of management to embrace alter-
native methods that would have improved competitive balance. A
renewed focus on payroll impact can lead to reforms that help MLRTs
successfully execute a concurrent star strategy, without decimating the
team's future prospects for success. Similarly, a revenue sharing sys-
tem that rewards successful MLRTs, instead of throwing money at un-
successful ones, will help effectuate the BRP's goal that "every well-
run club has a regularly recurring reasonable hope of reaching post-
season play."
Implementing these ideas-rather than pushing ahead with an ex-
pansion of the 2002 CBA reforms-would not have thwarted labor
peace. The sacrifices that MLBPA would make-such as a "harder"
luxury tax, draft slotting, a new service time schedule for under-23
117. BLUE RIBBON PANEL supra note 84, at 5
118. Although payor teams under the current retain an additional $51.8 million under the new
arrangement, the reverse Robin Hood effect is overstated. As Table 3 shows, teams like the
Astros. Giants, Cardinals, and Padres play in markets smaller than the league alerage. and gen-
erate above-average revenue only because of their success. Thus, rather than rewarding big
market teams, the new system rewards successful ones.
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players, and more compensation for departing free agent stars-are
balanced by the benefits it would gain from the new revenue sharing
system, earlier arbitration for young stars, and the "Hometown Dis-
count." Competitive balance is a worthy goal. Management and the
MLBPA could, and should, shoulder the costs of reform in an equita-
ble way.
Jon Berkon
